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Effects of payoff functions and preference distributions in an adaptive population
H. M. Yang, Y. S. Ting, and K. Y. Michael Wong∗
Department of Physics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China
Adaptive populations such as those in financial markets and distributed control can be modeled
by the Minority Game. We consider how their dynamics depends on the agents’ initial preferences
of strategies, when the agents use linear or quadratic payoff functions to evaluate their strategies.
We find that the fluctuations of the population making certain decisions (the volatility) depends on
the diversity of the distribution of the initial preferences of strategies. When the diversity decreases,
more agents tend to adapt their strategies together. In systems with linear payoffs, this results in
dynamical transitions from vanishing volatility to a non-vanishing one. For low signal dimensions,
the dynamical transitions for the different signals do not take place at the same critical diversity.
Rather, a cascade of dynamical transitions takes place when the diversity is reduced. In contrast,
no phase transitions are found in systems with the quadratic payoffs. Instead, a basin boundary of
attraction separates two groups of samples in the space of the agents’ decisions. Initial states inside
this boundary converge to small volatility, while those outside diverge to a large one. Furthermore,
when the preference distribution becomes more polarized, the dynamics becomes more erratic. All
the above results are supported by good agreement between simulations and theory.
PACS numbers: 05.70.Ln, 02.50.Le, 87.23.Ge, 64.60.Ht
I. INTRODUCTION
Many natural and artificial systems consist of a pop-
ulation of agents with coupled dynamics. Through their
mutual adaptation, they are able to exhibit interesting
collective behavior. Although the individuals are com-
peting to maximize their own payoffs, the system is able
to self-organize itself to globally efficient states. Exam-
ples can be found in economic markets and communica-
tion networks [1, 2, 3, 4].
As a prototype of an adaptive population, the Minority
Game (MG) considers the dynamics of buyers and sellers
in a model of the financial market in which the minority
group is the winning one [2]. The agents adapt to each
other through adjusting the payoffs of their strategies,
wherein the payoffs summarize the collective behavior of
the population when the environment changes. Theo-
retical studies using the replica method [5, 6] and the
generating functional [7, 8, 9] successfully describe the
statistical properties of these systems. However, since
adaptation is a dynamical process, much of the attractor
behavior remains to be explored.
An important factor affecting the behavior of an adap-
tive population is the dependence of the payoffs on the
environment experienced by the individual agents. The
payoffs help the agents to assess the preferences of their
decisions, hence inducing them to take certain actions
when they experience a similar dynamical environment
in the future. Thus, the payoff function is crucial to
the mechanism of adaptation. For example, the ways
the agents evaluate their strategies in financial markets
have a large influence on the market behavior. There
are agents who focus their attention mainly on opportu-
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nities of large profits, while others pay equal attention
to all profitable opportunities large and small. Markets
with individualistic agents may have diversified opinions
about what the best strategies are.
As an illustration of how payoffs influence market be-
haviors, a payoff scheme based on expected price trends
results in markets with a mixture of trend-followers and
contrarians [10]. The $-Game considers payoffs reward-
ing correct expectations one step forward, giving rise to
a self-sustained speculative phase [11]. Bubbles, crashes
and intermittent behaviors are also found in a similar
extension of the MG [12]. A recent extension of the
MG considers agents rewarding trend-following strate-
gies when the winning margin is small, and rewarding
contrarian ones otherwise [13, 14]. As a result, non-
Gaussian return distributions, sustained trends and bub-
bles are found, reminiscent of real markets. The Wealth
Game uses a wealth-based payoff scheme, and produces
behaviors resembling those of arbitrageurs and trendset-
ters, and markets with positive sums [15]. The Wealth
Game payoff scheme enables the agents to have a strong
history dependence when applied to Hang Seng index
data.
The agents in the original version of MG use a step
payoff function [2, 16, 17], meaning that the payoffs re-
ceived by the winning group are the same, irrespective
of the winning margin (the difference between the ma-
jority and the minority groups). Latter versions of MG
use a linear payoff function [5, 6, 7, 8, 9], in which the
payoffs increase with the winning margin. Other payoff
functions yield the same macroscopic behaviors in their
dependence of the population variance on the complexity
of strategies [18, 19]. Thus, it appears that the behav-
ior of the population is universal as long as the payoff
function favors the minority group.
However, when one considers details beyond the popu-
lation variance, one can find that the agents self-organize
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off function that favors a large winning margin, the distri-
bution of the buyer population is double-peaked [2]. This
shows that the dynamics of the population self-organizes
to favor large winning margins of either buyers or sellers,
because the agents have adapted themselves to maximize
their payoffs.
Another important factor is the initial preference of an
agent towards the individual strategies she holds. Con-
sidering the example of financial markets, the agents may
enter the market with their own preferences of strate-
gies according to their individual objectives, expectations
and available capital, even in the case that they hold
the same set of strategies. For example, some agents
have stronger inclinations towards aggressive strategies,
and others more conservative. Hence, it is interesting to
consider the effects of a diverse distribution of strategy
preferences on the system behavior. Our recent work on
MG revealed that when the diversity of strategy prefer-
ences increases, the system dynamics generally converges
slowly, but the maladaptation of the agents, as gener-
ally reflected in the fluctuations of their decisions, can
be greatly reduced [20, 21]. A scaling relation between
the population variance and the diversity was found, but
there are no dynamical transitions [20, 21].
Besides the diversity of preferences, the profile of the
diversity distributions also influences the dynamics of the
system. For example, the Gaussian distribution of pref-
erences studied in [20, 21] is a prototype of a continuous
distribution, modeling a population with less polarized
opinion. This distribution is different from the bimodal
distribution studied in [7, 8, 22, 23, 24], which is more
appropriate to model a population with polarized opin-
ion. Both cases share many common statistical features,
such as the reduction of fluctuations on increasing diver-
sity. However, since adaptation is a dynamical process,
one would expect that the bimodal case may have a much
more erratic temporal behavior than the Gaussian case.
This constitutes one of the purposes of our study.
In this paper, we consider the attractor behavior of
an adaptive population using linear and quadratic pay-
off functions, with the distribution of initial preferences
being either Gaussian or bimodal. While the statistical
behaviors in these cases are quite similar, their attractor
behaviors are different, revealing the different dynamics
by which a population adapts to its specific environment.
A number of findings in this paper illustrate this point.
For example, when the step payoff function is replaced
by the linear payoff function, the scaling relation between
population variance and diversity is replaced by a dynam-
ical transition between vanishing and non-vanishing step
sizes. For low signal dimensions, the dynamical tran-
sitions take place in the form of cascades for different
signal dimensions. Even when the cascades are blurred
at higher signal dimensions, it is possible that there is
a crossover from anisotropic to isotropic motion in the
phase space. When the Gaussian preference distribution
is replaced by the bimodal distribution, the dynamics
becomes more bursty, and the phase space motion be-
comes more jumpy. Going from linear to quadratic pay-
offs, we find that the basins of attractor for vanishing and
non-vanishing step sizes coexist. All these rich behaviors
demonstrate the flexibility of an adaptive population for
self-organizing to states in which agents maximize their
payoffs and is, hence, important in modeling of economics
and distributed control.
The paper is organized as follows. After formulating
MG in Section II, we consider the cases of linear and
quadratic payoffs in Sections III and IV respectively, fol-
lowed by a conclusion in section V. Detailed derivatives
are presented in Appendices A to C.
II. MINORITY GAME
The Minority Game model consists a population of N
agents competing for limited resources, N being odd [2].
Each agent makes a decision 1 or 0 at each time step,
and the minority group wins. For economic markets, the
decisions 1 and 0 correspond to buying and selling re-
spectively, so that the buyers can win by belonging to
the minority group, which pushes the price down, and
vice versa. For typical control tasks, such as the distri-
bution of shared resources, the decisions 1 and 0 may
represent two alternative resources so that fewer agents
utilizing a resource implies more abundance. The de-
cisions of each agent are responses to the environment
of the game, described by signal µ∗(t) at time t, where
µ∗(t) = 0, ..., D − 1. These responses are prescribed by
strategies, which are binary functions mapping the D sig-
nals to decisions 1 or 0. In this paper, we consider both
endogenous signals and exogenous signals. In the endoge-
nous case, the signals are the history of the winning bits
in the most recent m steps. Thus, the strategies have
an input dimension of D = 2m. In the exogenous case,
the signals are randomly generated from the D possible
choices at each time step. The parameter α ≡ D/N is
referred to as the complexity.
Before the game starts, each agent randomly picks s
strategies. Out of her s strategies, each agent makes de-
cisions according to the most successful one at each step.
The success of a strategy is measured by its cumulative
payoff, as explained below.
Let ξµa = ±1 when the decisions of strategy a are 1
or 0, responding to signal µ. Let a∗(i, t) be the strategy
adopted by agent i at time t. Then,
A(t) ≡ 1
N
∑
i
ξ
µ∗(t)
a∗(i,t)
is the excess demand of the game at time t. The payoff
received by strategy a is then −ξµ∗(t)a ϕ(
√
NA(t)), where
ϕ is the payoff function. The step and linear payoffs are
ϕ(χ) = sgnχ and χ, respectively. Let Ωa(t) be the cu-
mulative payoff of strategy a at time t. We will consider
both online and batch updates of the payoffs. The online
3updating dynamics is described by
Ωa(t+ 1) = Ωa(t)− ξµ
∗(t)
a ϕ(
√
NA(t)), (1)
whereas the batch updating dynamics is given by
Ωa(t+ 1) = Ωa(t)−
∑
µ
ξµaϕ(
√
NAµ(t)), (2)
wherein Aµ(t) is a D-dimensional vector
Aµ(t) ≡ 1
N
∑
i
ξµa∗(i,t).
The diversity of initial preferences of strategies is in-
troduced by initializing the cumulative payoffs Ωia(t) of
strategy a (a= 2, ..., s) of agent i at time t = 0 to ran-
dom biases ωia, with Ωia(0) = 0 for a = 1 [20, 21]. Thus,
the preferences influence the score of each strategy for
the rest of the game. In this paper, we will consider
both the Gaussian and delta distributions of the initial
preferences of the strategies. In the Gaussian case, the
preference distribution has a mean 0 and variance R,
P (ωia) =
e−ω
2
ia/2R√
2piR
. (3)
The ratio ρ ≡ R/N is referred to as the diversity. In
the delta function case, ωia =
√
ρN, as considered in [7].
Since the system behavior is invariant with respect to
random permutations of the strategies, the introduction
of the delta function is equivalent to a bimodal preference
distribution
P (ωia) = δ(ωia −
√
ρN)/2 + δ(ωia +
√
ρN)/2, (4)
with mean 0 and standard deviation
√
ρN. As we shall
see, the two preferences distributions have different ef-
fects on the dynamics of the game.
To monitor the mutual adaptive behavior of the popu-
lation, we measure the variance σ2/N of the population
making decision 1, as defined by
σ2
N
≡ N
4
〈[Aµ∗(t)(t)− 〈Aµ∗(t)(t)〉]2〉, (5)
where the average is taken over time when the system
reaches steady state and over the random distribution of
strategies and biases.
III. MG WITH LINEAR PAYOFFS
A. THE GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTION OF
STRATEGIES’ INITIAL PREFERENCES
1. The onset of instability.
We first consider the case of online dynamics with a
Gaussian distribution of initial preferences. As Fig. 1
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FIG. 1: σ2/N versus α with linear payoffs for ρ = 0, 0.25, 1,
and 4, for N = 251, s = 2, and 1000 samples. Inset: The
corresponding plot for step payoffs.
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FIG. 2: σ2/N versus ρ with linear payoffs of α = 0.002, 0.01,
and 0.02 for different m and N . Inset: σ2/N versus ρ with
step payoffs m = 1, and N = 127, 511, 2047, and 8191. The
dashed-dotted line is the scaling prediction. For both payoffs,
s = 2 and the number of samples is 1000.
shows, the dependence of the variance σ2/N on the com-
plexity α for linear payoffs is very similar to that for step
payoffs [20, 21]. For α above a universal critical value
αc (≈ 0.3), the variance drops when α is reduced. The
effect of introducing the diversity is also similar to that
for step payoffs; namely, the variance remains unaffected
when α > αc, but decreases significantly with the diver-
sity when α < αc.
However, there are differences when one goes beyond
this general trend. As Fig. 2 shows, the variance curves
at different values of α cross at ρ = ρc ≈ 0.16, indicating
the existence of a continuous phase transition at ρc from
a phase of vanishing variance at large ρ to a phase of
finite variance at small ρ. This behavior is very different
from that for step payoffs, where the variance scales as
ρ−1 and there are no dynamical transitions (Fig. 2 inset).
The picture is confirmed by analyzing the dynamics of
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FIG. 3: Attractor dynamics for m = 1 in (a) endogenous
dynamics, and (b) exogenous dynamics with online update.
ρ = 0.01
the game for smallm. The dynamics can be conveniently
described by introducing the D-dimensional vector Aµ(t)
which is defined in Eq. (2). While only one of the D
signals corresponds to the historical signal µ∗(t) of the
game, the augmentation to D components is necessary
to describe the attractor structure of the game dynam-
ics. Fig. 3(a) illustrates the attractor structure in this
phase space for the visualizable case ofm = 1 with online
update and endogenous signals. The dynamics proceeds
in the direction that tends to reduce the magnitude of
the components of Aµ(t) [5]. However, the components
of Aµ(t) overshoot, resulting in periodic attractors of pe-
riod 2D. For m = 1, the attractor is described by the se-
quence µ∗(t) = 0, 1, 1, 0, and takes the L-shape as shown
in Fig. 3(a) [21]. Note that the displacements in the two
directions may not have the same amplitude. This is also
true for online update and exogenous signals as Fig. 3(b)
shows, although it does not have periodic attractors like
those in Fig. 3(a).
Following steps similar to those in [21], we find that
form not too large and for convergence within time steps
much less than
√
R,
Aµ(t+ 1) = Aµ(t)−
√
2
piR
ϕ(
√
NAµ(t))δµµ∗(t). (6)
For step payoffs, Eq. (6) converges to an attractor con-
fined in a D-dimensional hypercube of size
√
2/piR, irre-
spective of the value of R. On the other hand, for linear
payoffs, Aµ(t+1) becomes a linear function of Aµ(t) with
a slope of 1−
√
2/piρ. Hence, for ρ > ρc = 1/2pi ∼ 0.16,
the step sizes
∆Aµ(t) ≡| Aµ(t+ 1)−Aµ(t) |
converge to zero. In particular for 1/2pi < ρ < 2/pi, the
motion in the phase space converges with oscillations,
whereas for ρ > 2/pi, the motion converges without oscil-
lations. On the other hand, for ρ < ρc, steps of vanishing
sizes become unstable, resulting in a continuous dynam-
ical transition at ρc.
The phase transition at ρc illustrates how the agents
adapt to the changing environment when the diversity
changes. In general, at high diversity, only a small frac-
tion of agents switches their strategies at each time step.
This gentle movement results in, at most, small win-
ning margins, as revealed in the example of step payoffs
[20, 21]. In contrast, the winning margins at low diver-
sity can be larger. Since we are considering payoffs that
are linear functions of the winning margin, the agents
are adapted to pay more attention to decisions that re-
sult in larger profits, leading to stronger responses at low
diversity and vanishing responses at high diversity.
2. The time scales of convergence.
The onset of the instability when ρ decreases is accom-
panied by the separation of two convergence times. The
first time scale is the state convergence time, which is
defined as the number of time steps needed to reach the
attractor (for m = 1, this is the sequence 0,1,1,0) [26].
The second time scale is the population convergence
time which is defined for online update and endogenous
dynamics as follows. Note that the excess demand A(t)
may not arrive at the steady-state time series even af-
ter the attractor states −sgnA(t) become steady. To
measure the convergence time scale for A(t), the peri-
odic trend of A(t) in the attractor must be subtracted.
This is done by measuring the sample average of Ai =
〈A(t)〉mod(t,2D)=i for i = 0, ..., 2D−1 and monitoring the
time dependence of A(t) − Amod(t,2D). As shown in the
inset of Fig. 4, this difference converges exponentially to
a baseline, and the inverse of the slope of the exponen-
tial convergence yields the population convergence time.
As shown in Fig. 4, the state convergence time increases
smoothly with diversity. On the other hand, the popula-
tion convergence time is distinct from the state conver-
gence time in the low diversity region. The turning point
is between ρ = 0.13 and 0.25, indicating a relation with
the dynamical transition of step sizes at ρc.
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FIG. 4: The dependence of the state and population conver-
gence time on the diversity for online update, endogenous dy-
namics, linear payoffs and Gaussian preference distribution.
Inset: the relation between A− 〈A〉 and t from the transient
to the steady state for ρ = 7.943. Parameters: m = 1, s = 2,
and N = 255, averaged over 1000 samples.
3. Cascades of transitions.
However, when ρ < ρc, the step sizes for each of the
D signals may not be equal. To see this, we monitor the
variance for each of the D signals and rank them. The
rth maximum variance is then given by
Sr = largeµ
(
N
4
[〈(Aµ)2〉|µ=µ∗(t) − (〈Aµ〉|µ=µ∗(t))2], r
)
,(7)
where largeµ(f(µ), r) is the rth largest function f(µ) for
µ = 0, ..., D−1. As Figs. 5-6 show, the step sizes for theD
signals do not bifurcate simultaneously at ρ = ρc, Rather,
only the first maximum bifurcates from zero when ρ falls
below ρc, while the step sizes for the remaining D−1 sig-
nals remain small. When the diversity further decreases
to around 0.05, the second maximum becomes unstable
as well, and a further bifurcation takes place. For m ≥ 2,
there are further bifurcations of the third or higher order
maxima, resulting in a cascade of dynamical transitions
when the diversity decreases.
This cascade of transitions is confirmed by analysis.
For m = 1, we can generalize Eq. (6) to convergence
times of the order
√
R. Assuming, without loss of gener-
ality, that A1 bifurcates while A0 remains small. We find
that the variance of the buyer population, as derived in
Appendix A, is
σ2
N
=
N
32
(∆A1)2, ∆A1 = erf
(
∆A1√
8ρ
)
, (8)
where ∆A1 is the step size responding to signal 1. As
the inset in Fig. 5 shows, the analytical and the simu-
lated results agree down to ρ ∼ 0.05. However, when the
diversity decreases further, this simple analysis implies
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FIG. 5: Sr versus ρ for online update, endogenous dynamics,
linear payoffs and Gaussian preference distribution. Inset:
σ2/N versus ρ. The symbols are the simulation, the dotted
line the theory with one bifurcation, and the solid lines the
theory with two bifurcations. N = 1001, m = 1, s = 2, and
1000 samples.
that the variance will saturate to a constant N/32, but
simulated results are clearly higher. This discrepancy is
due to a further bifurcation of the minimum step size.
This can be analyzed by considering the effect of a per-
turbation δA0(t) in the direction of A0. As derived in
Appendix B, the accumulated perturbation becomes
δA0(t+ 4) =
[
1− 1√
2piρ
(1 + e−
(∆A1)2
8ρ )
]2
δA0(t). (9)
At ρ = 0.0459, where ∆A1 = 0.9775, the coefficient on
the right-hand side of Eq. (9) reaches the value 1, and
δA0(t) diverges on further reduction of ρ. Numerical it-
erations of the analytical equations for Aµ(t), averaged
over samples of different initial conditions, yield the the-
oretical curves in Fig. 5 and the inset, agreeing very well
with the simulated results. Similarly, the agreement be-
tween analytical and simulated results are satisfactory
for m = 2, as shown in Fig. 6(a).
For m = 3, as shown in Fig. 6(b), the bifurcation of
S1, remains distinctive from those of other directions,
and the picture of at least one cascade is valid. Fur-
thermore, we observe that in the low diversity limit for
m = 1, 2, 3, the maximum step size approaches the same
value of N/16 following the arguments in Appendix A.
We also want to mention that results show that although
the attractor structure of online update with exogenous
signals is different from that with endogenous signals, the
dependence of Sr and σ
2/N on ρ are totally the same for
both signals.
This shows that the cascades are a general feature of
the adaptive dynamics of the agents. When the diversity
decreases, the agents find it more profitable to induce
large winning margins responding to certain, but not all
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FIG. 6: Sr versus ρ for online update, endogenous dynamics,
linear payoffs and Gaussian preference distribution(a) m = 2,
(b)m = 3. In both cases, N = 1001, s = 2, and 1000 samples.
signals. At sufficiently low diversity, large winning mar-
gins become possible responses to all, signals, resulting
in the cascades of transitions. However, for large signal
dimensions at higher m, the interference of the responses
to different signals will blur the transitions.
4. Batch update
We close this section briefly mentioning the results of
batch update. We found that the variance of the buyer
population with batch update is larger than that with
online update (those of endogenous and exogenous sig-
nals update are the same) and the difference increase as
α increases, as shown in Fig. 7. We also found that the
dynamical transition to non-vanishing step sizes in the
case of online update was replaced by a gradual crossover
around ρ ∼ 0.2, and the cascades of transitions in differ-
ent directions are replaced by a simultaneous crossover
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FIG. 7: σ2/N versus ρ for linear payoffs and Gaussian pref-
erence distribution. (a) m = 1; (b) m = 4. In both cases,
N = 1001, s = 2, and 1000 samples.
around ρ ∼ 0.2.
B. THE BIMODAL DISTRIBUTION OF
STRATEGIES’ PREFERENCES
In this section we consider how the dynamics depends
on different distributions of agents’ initial preferences
of strategies. In the previous section we have studied
the case of Gaussian distributions of preferences, which
model populations with less polarized opinions. In this
section, we replace the Gaussian distribution with a bi-
modal distribution described by Eq. (4), which is more
appropriate to model a population with polarized opin-
ions. As we shall see, the latter shares many common
statistical features with the former, such as the cascades
of dynamical transitions (subsection 1) and the change in
the isotropy of motion (subsection 2) when the diversity
7changes. On the other hand, the latter exhibits more er-
ratic temporal behavior, such as the changing fraction of
time spent on locations of high and low volatility in the
attractor (subsection 3) and the bursty dynamics (sub-
section 4). The theoretical dynamical equations for both
batch and online updates are derived in Appendix C.
1. Cascades of dynamical transitions
We found that for batch updates, Fig. 8(a) shows that
the cascade of dynamical transitions is present for small
signal dimensions but disappears as signal dimensions in-
crease. For large signal dimensions, step sizes for different
signal dimensions bifurcate simultaneously at ρ ∼ 0.09.
As shown in Fig. 8(b), there is a large jump of S1, indi-
cating that it is a discontinuous transition, while for the
Gaussian case, it is a continuous transition. This discon-
tinuous transition was found previously in [7], and the
transition point is around ρc ∼ 0.06 with the magnitude
of the jump scaling as α−
1
2 . Results are similar for online
update.
2. Isotropy of motion
For batch update, we have devised new global parame-
ters to describe whether the motion in the phase space is
isotropic at each update. For D = 2, the two parameters
are
U1 ≡ 〈〈[(∆A1)2 − (∆A0)2]2〉t〉sample
and
V1 ≡ 〈〈[2∆A1∆A0]2〉t〉sample,
they measure the displacements along the axial or diag-
onal directions in the phase space of A1 and A0.
We can see from Fig. 9 that as diversity decreases, the
axial parameter grows from nearly zero to nonzero val-
ues at around 0.2, while the diagonal parameter remains
small. This shows that at each time step, the system
responds to only one signal. When ρ decreases to about
0.06, the diagonal parameter becomes nonzero too, show-
ing that the system responds to more than one signal at
each time step, and the motion becomes more isotropic.
This cascade behavior is also well supported by our the-
ory displayed on the same figure.
For higher signal dimensions, the isotropy of motions
in the attractors can be described by ranking the D com-
ponents of randomly picked step sizes. The ranked com-
ponents of different samples, as shown in Fig. 10, exhibit
several classes of behavior with increasing isotropy. Sam-
ples in Fig. 10(a) correspond to small steps in all dimen-
sions. Those in Fig. 10(b) correspond to steps with one
large component and D − 1 small components. Steps in
Figs. 10(c) and (d) have, respectively, two and more than
two large components.
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FIG. 8: Sr versus ρ for batch update, linear payoffs and bi-
modal preference distribution (a) m = 1 and (b) m = 4. In
both cases, N = 1001, s = 2, 1000 samples, and batch up-
dates.
As shown in Fig. 11, attractors with small step sizes
are dominant in the region of large ρ. Step sizes increase
when ρ decreases, but the non-vanishing components do
not increases isotropically. Rather, steps with one or two
non-vanishing components become significant when ρ ∼
0.2, and become more isotropic on further reduction of
ρ.
This sequential onset of isotropy is consistent with the
cascade of dynamical transitions for the Gaussian on-
line case when the diversity decreases. However, when m
increases further, interferences between different signal
dimensions will blur the anisotropic attractors.
3. Attractor structure
The structures of the attractors also change with ρ.
For convenience, we take the example of m = 1, whose
phase space can be plotted in two dimensions. From
80.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
V
1
 U
1  
 
 
 U1 theory
 U1 simulation
 V1 theory
 V1 simulation
FIG. 9: U1 and V1 versus ρ for batch update, linear payoffs
and bimodal preference distribution, m = 1, s = 2, N = 1001,
and 1000 samples.
Fig. 12, we can see that the attractor structure with
bimodal distribution is totally different from that with
Gaussian distribution. For systems with Gaussian dis-
tribution and batch update, the attractor has only two
clusters of fixed points, between which systems oscillate
(Fig. 12(a)), whereas for systems with bimodal distri-
bution, the attractor visits many points located around
an octagon in the small ρ phase (ρ < ρc), as shown in
Fig. 12(b). The system jumps among these points and
occasionally stays at the origin. However in the large ρ
phase (ρ > ρc), the system will spend more time around
the origin with occasional jumping out and back.
4. Bursty dynamics
Unlike the case of Gaussian distributions, the transi-
tion from vanishing to non-vanishing step sizes on de-
creasing diversity takes place in a bursty manner. For a
given diversity, we define the activity as the fraction of
time that the system stays away from the origin in the
phase space. Fig. 13 shows that the activity is low at
high diversities, but increases to a high value when ρ is
reduced below a critical value ρc. This critical value ρc
depends on α. Estimating ρ as the point with an activity
of 0.5 in Fig. 13, ρc ∼ 0.07 and 0.1 for α = 0.016 and
0.032 respectively. We anticipate that ρc approaches the
value of 0.06 in the limit vanishing α, as proposed by [7].
Looking deeper into the dynamics, we can find bursty
behavior by introducing the payoff components kµ(t),
which are related to the accumulative payoffs by
Ωa(t) =
∑
µ
kµ(t)ξ
µ
a . (10)
In other words, kµ(t) is the total payoff of decision 1 of
strategy a for signal µ during the history of the game
up to time t. For m = 1, the payoff components k0 and
k1 also have different behaviors at low and high diversi-
ties. As shown in Fig. 14(a) for low diversity, both k0
and k1 oscillate around 0 with large step sizes, resulting
in the phase with non-vanishing variance. In contrast,
Fig. 14(b) shows that for high diversities, the payoffs ac-
cumulate with small step sizes, building up gradually to
high values, and then return to low values with a huge
step size. This bursty process resembles many natural
phenomena in which energy is stored gradually and re-
leased suddenly, such as earthquakes and volcano erup-
tions.
IV. MG WITH QUADRATIC PAYOFF
FUNCTIONS
To see how the behavior depends on the payoff func-
tions, we change the payoff to the form of ϕ(x) =
x2sgn(x) where x =
√
NA(t). Figure 15 shows the gen-
eral trend that a greater diversity gives a smaller variance
of attendance and this effect is especially sensitive in the
intermediate diversity region. It does not show any scal-
ing behavior like in the step payoff model, nor any phase
transition in the linear payoff model. Instead, it shows
that a larger population always have a greater drop in
the variance and a lower minimum variance.
Besides, we are also interested to investigate how the
initial position of the game affects its variance. First,
1000 samples were simulated for each of the several dif-
ferent diversities. Then the variance for the 1000 samples
was arranged in ascending order and listed graphically in
Fig. 16.
We can see that more and more samples have a rela-
tively small variance as the diversity becomes larger. For
each curve in Fig. 16, the arrangement of the variance
shows a gap in the variance, as pointed by an arrow. To
facilitate the explanation, we define samples that are left
to the gap to be ”small variance”, while those that are
right to the gap to be ”large variance”.
We find that these two groups of samples are strongly
correlated with the initial states of the system. From
Figs. 17(a) to (d), it shows a general trend that the ini-
tial positions of the small variance samples concentrate
around the origin while those of the large variance sam-
ples spread around. A basin boundary which is indicated
by the lines appears among the light (orange) and dark
(pink) dots and it becomes more recognizable at higher
diversity. Also, we can notice that more samples with
small variance and less samples with large variance ap-
pear as the diversity increases.
To determine the boundary analytically, we should
look into the dynamics of the payoff function, Following
the steps similar to those in Section III, we found
Aµ(t+ 1) = Aµ(t)−
√
2
piR
(
√
NAµ(t))2sgnAµ(t) (11)
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FIG. 10: (a) to (d) Ranked step sizes for four classes of behavior with increasing isotropy, in batch update, linear payoffs and
bimodal preference distribution. m = 3, s = 2, N = 1001, ρ = 0.04, and 200 samples.
The square boundary can then be determined through
the intersection between the Eq. (11) and the lines y =
−x.
−Aµ(t) = Aµ(t)−
√
2
piR
(
√
NAµ(t))2 (12)
or
√
NAµ(t) = ±
√
2piρ (13)
If the initial position of the system is located inside this
basin boundary, that is, |NAµ(0)| < √2piR, Aµ(t) will
eventually converge to the origin, which implies that the
agents are not motivated to respond to the low payoffs.
If the initial position of the system locates outside this
basin boundary, Aµ(t) will eventually diverge, It implies
that the agents are motivated to respond to high payoffs.
Also, from Eq. (13), the boundary increases with diver-
sity ρ. Thus, a larger diversity will give a smaller size of
the basin of attraction for samples with large variance.
After locating the basin boundary, we can compute the
probability of finding attractors with small variance and
large variance, respectively. Since the probability density
function of the initial state
√
NAµ(0) is Gaussian with
mean = 0 and variance = 1, the probability of finding
small variance attractor is given by
Psmall = (erf
√
piρ)2 (14)
and the probability of finding large variance attractor is
Plarge = 1− Psmall.
This result is consistent with the simulation in that when
the diversity is large, the probability of finding samples
with small variance will be higher. A comparison between
theory and simulation is given in Fig. 18, which shows a
good agreement.
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FIG. 11: The fraction of the four classes of step sizes as a
function of ρ, in batch update, linear payoffs and bimodal
preference distribution. Other parameters: same as those in
Fig. 10.
V. CONCLUSION
We have studied the behavior of an adaptive popula-
tion by using a payoff function that increases linearly and
quadratically with the winning margin. We found in lin-
ear payoffs, a continuous dynamical transition when the
adaptation rate of the population was tuned by varying
their diversity of preferences. This is in contrast with the
case of payoff functions independent of the winning mar-
gin, in which there is only a scaling relation between the
variance and the diversity, and no phase transitions are
found. The dynamical transition is due to the payoffs be-
ing enhanced by large winning margins at low diversity.
Furthermore, for systems with multi-dimensional signals
feeding the strategies, we found a cascade of dynamical
transitions in the responses to different signals, with the
population variance increasing at each cascade. When
the cascades are blurred at higher signal dimensions, a
classification of the step vectors as done in Fig. 10 also
reveals the possibility of a crossover from anisotropic to
isotropic motion in the phase space.
We have also studied the effects of polarization of the
initial preference distribution on the attractor behavior
of the system by comparing the Gaussian and bimodal
distributions. In the Gaussian case, there is a gradual in-
crease in step sizes when the diversity decreases, whereas
in the bimodal case, there is rather a sharp increase in
the fraction of time with non-vanishing sizes in a narrow
range of diversity, as shown in Fig. 13. We also found
that for bimodal distributions, the payoff components go
through processes of accumulation and bursts. These
observations illustrate that the more polarized the pref-
erences are, the more erratic the dynamics is. There are
many similarities shared among the different cases that
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FIG. 12: The attractors of m = 1 in the phase space for batch
update and linear payoffs:(a) Gaussian preference distribu-
tion, ρ = 0.01; (b)bimodal distribution for small ρ (ρ = 0.004)
and (c)large ρ (ρ = 0.04) respectively. Both for batch update.
we have studied. For both Gaussian and bimodal dis-
tributions, there are cascades for low signal dimensions
which gradually disappear as signal dimensions increase.
For online update, both endogenous and exogenous sig-
nals result in similar macroscopic behaviors, for example,
the diversity dependence of the variance of the buyer pop-
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FIG. 13: The activity as a function of diversity for bimodal
distribution of preferences, batch update and linear payoffs.
ulation and the ranked step sizes.
For quadratic payoffs, a basin boundary separating two
groups of samples is found. The group of vanishing step
sizes adapts to the low payoff region of the quadratic
payoff function and the group of non-vanishing step sizes
adapts to the region with more rapidly increasing payoffs
of the quadratic payoff function.
In summary, we have found three pathways through
which fluctuations increase with decreasing diversity. For
linear payoffs with Gaussian preference distribution, fluc-
tuations increase by increasing step sizes via cascades of
continuous dynamical transitions. For linear payoffs with
bimodal distributions, fluctuations increase is also due to
the increase in the fraction of time with non-vanishing
step sizes. For quadratic payoffs, fluctuations increase
by enlarging the basin of the attractors with large fluc-
tuations. This illustrates the rich behavior that the pop-
ulation can self-organize in different environments.
It is interesting to consider the phenomenology experi-
enced by the agents at each side of the described dynam-
ical transitions and crossovers. In this respect, we make
the following observations.
1) Agents using linear payoffs focus more of their atten-
tion on opportunities of large winning margins, and tend
more to neglect marginal wins. In markets with high
diversity, agents with different preferences switch their
strategies at different times, preventing the occurrence of
a high volatility. Since the volatility is not large enough
to induce strategy switches of such agents focusing more
on large winning margins, the market is self-organized
to a state of low volatility. However, in markets with
low diversity, more agents switch their strategies at the
same time, and the volatility is high. These profitable op-
portunities are exploited by the agents more sensitive to
large winning margins, and the market is self-organized
to a state of high volatility. In markets with intermedi-
ate diversity, the agents are selectively sensitive to some,
but not all, of the signals in the market, leading to the
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FIG. 14: The payoff components k0 and k1 as a function
of time t of a typical sample with bimodal distributions of
preferences, batch update and linear payoffs. Parameters are
m = 1, s = 2, and N = 1001, for (a) ρ = 0.01; (b) ρ = 0.4.
cascades of phase transitions.
2) For agents using quadratic payoffs, their interest on
marginal wins vanishes even faster. Hence the market is
self-organized to a state of low volatility when the initial
volatility is low, irrespective of the diversity of prefer-
ences of strategies. On the other hand, their emphasis on
large winning margins rises even faster than linear pay-
offs. Hence the market is self-organized to a state of high
volatility when the initial volatility is high, irrespective
of the diversity. Changes in the diversity cannot pre-
clude the attractors of either high or low volatility. They
merely influence the sizes of their basins of attraction.
3) Both cases of linear and quadratic payoffs are dif-
ferent from the case of step payoffs [20, 21]. Agents us-
ing step payoffs place an equal emphasis on all winning
opportunities irrespective of the winning margin. Con-
sequently, the volatility does not vanish at any values
of diversity, and there are no dynamical transitions or
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FIG. 15: The dependence of variance on the diversity for
online update, quadratic payoffs, endogenous dynamics and
Gaussian preference distribution at (a) s = 2, m = 1 and
averaged over 1000 samples. (b) s = 2, m = 2 and averaged
over 1000 samples.
multiple basins of attraction. Instead. a scaling relation
between the volatility and the diversity is applicable.
4) In markets with a bimodal distribution of initial
preferences, the agents have polarized opinions about
their responses to the signals. When the diversity is high,
it takes a large number of time steps before the opinions
of a group of agents are reversed. This gives rise to peri-
ods of vanishing volatility, during which the system stays
at the origin of the phase space. When the opinions of
the agent group is eventually reversed, bursts of activities
erupt.
Recent attention was drawn to the role of the payoff
function on reproducing realistic market behavior such as
non-Gaussian features, the formation of sustained trends
and bubbles, and intermittency [13, 14]. Our study fur-
ther confirms that tuning the payoff function and the
preference distribution can lead to a rich spectrum of self-
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FIG. 16: The variance of 1000 samples arranged in ascend-
ing order for ρ = 0.004, 0.008, 0.032, and 1, for online update,
quadratic payoffs, endogenous dynamics and Gaussian pref-
erence distribution. In all cases, N = 255, s = 2, and m = 1.
organized states of the market. It would be interesting to
consider populations of agents with different individual
payoff functions and study how they interact.
APPENDIX A: THE EQUATIONS OF MOTION
IN MG WITH LINEAR PAYOFFS
We consider the equations of motion in MG with lin-
ear payoffs. Here, we focus on the case of a Gaussian
distribution of initial preferences, and the generalization
to the case of the bimodal distribution is straightforward.
Using Eq. (1), and averaging over Eq. (3), we obtain the
step size for the historical state µ = µ∗(t).
〈∆Aµ(t)〉 = 1
22D−1
∑
a<b
∫
dω√
2piR
e−ω
2/2R(ξµa − ξµb )
×[Θ(ω +Ωa(t+ 1)− Ωb(t+ 1))
−Θ(ω +Ωa(t)− Ωb(t))]. (A1)
Since the integral representation of the step function is
given by
Θ(y) =
∫ ∞
0
dx
∫
dp
2pi
eip(x−y), (A2)
Eq. (A1) becomes
〈∆Aµ(t)〉 = 1
22D−1
∑
a<b
∫
dω√
2piR
e−ω
2/2R(ξµa − ξµb )
×
∫ ∞
0
dx
∫
dp
2pi
eip(ω−x)[eip(Ωa(t+1)−Ωb(t+1))
−eip(Ωa(t)−Ωb(t))]. (A3)
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FIG. 17: (color online) The distribution of the variance related to its initial position for online update, quadratic payoffs,
endogenous dynamics and Gaussian preference distribution, N = 255, s = 2,m = 1 and (a) ρ = 0.004. (b) ρ = 0.063. (c)
ρ = 0.251. (d) ρ = 0.501.
Decomposing the cumulative payoffs into payoff com-
ponents as defined in Eq. (10), Eq. (A3) becomes
〈∆Aµ(t)〉 = 1
22D−1
∑
a<b
∫
dω√
2piR
e−ω
2/2R
×
∫ ∞
0
dx
∫
dp
2pi
eip(ω−x)
∏
ν 6=µ
eipkν(t)(ξ
ν
a−ξνb )
×[eip(kµ−
√
NAµ)(ξµa−ξµb ) − eipkµ(ξµa−ξµb )]
×(ξµa − ξµb ). (A4)
Using the identity for ξµa , ξ
µ
b = ±1 and
eiθ(ξ
µ
a−ξµb ) = cos2 θ + i sin θ cos θ(ξµa − ξµb ) + sin2 θξµa ξµb ,
we arrive at
〈∆Aµ(t)〉 =
∫ ∞
0
dx
∫
dp
2pi
e−
R
2 p
2−ipx ×∏
ν 6=µ
cos2 pkν [i sin 2p(kµ −
√
NAµ)−i sin 2pkµ].(A5)
where we have used the identity
∑
a ξ
µ
a = 0.
Similarly, for the non-historical states ν 6= µ∗(t), we
have
〈∆Aν(t)〉 =
∫ ∞
0
dx
∫
dp
2pi
e−
R
2 p
2−ipx
×
∏
λ6=µν
cos2 pkλ2i sin pkν cos pkν
×[cos2 p(kµ −
√
NAµ)− cos2 pkµ]. (A6)
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FIG. 18: The comparison of the theoretical and simulative
probabilities of finding samples with small variance for online
update, quadratic payoffs, endogenous dynamics and Gaus-
sian preference distribution, N = 255, s = 2, and m = 1.
For m = 1, there are only two states. Let µ and µ be
the historical and non-historical states respectively.
After evaluating the integrals, we obtain
〈∆Aµ(t)〉 = 1
8
[
erf
2kµ(t+ 1) + 2kµ(t)√
2R
+erf
2kµ(t+ 1)− 2kµ(t)√
2R
+ 2erf
2kµ(t+ 1)√
2R
−erf 2kµ(t) + 2kµ(t)√
2R
− erf 2kµ(t)− 2kµ(t)√
2R
−2erf 2kµ(t)√
2R
]
. (A7)
〈∆Aµ(t)〉 = 1
8
[
erf
2kµ(t+ 1) + 2kµ(t)√
2R
−erf 2kµ(t+ 1)− 2kµ(t)√
2R
− erf 2kµ(t) + 2kµ(t)√
2R
+erf
2kµ(t)− 2kµ(t)√
2R
]
, (A8)
where kµ(t+ 1) = kµ(t)−
√
NAµ(t).
Now suppose µ = 0 at t = 0. Following the dynamics
sketched in Fig. 19, we can calculate kµ and kµ as follows:
k0(1) = k0(0)−
√
NA0(0), k1(1) = k1(0)
k0(2) = k0(1), k1(2) = k1(1)−
√
NA1(1)
k0(3) = k0(2), k1(3) = k1(2)−
√
NA1(2)
k0(0) = k0(3)−
√
NA0(3), k1(0) = k1(3) (A9)
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FIG. 19: Attractor dynamics when (a) |∆A1| is larger and
(b) |∆A0| is larger.
Eqs. (A7-A9) are the equations of motion in the phase
space. When A1, A0 ∼ N−1/2 and k1, k0 ∼ N0, we
obtain Eq. (6) for linear payoffs using Taylor expan-
sion. On the other hand, there exist solutions with
non-vanishing step sizes along one of the two directions,
and vanishing step sizes along the remaining direction.
Suppose ∆A0 ∼ N−1/2 and k0(t) ≈ k0 = constant,
and ∆A1 ∼ N0. From k1(0) = k1(3) in Eq. (A9), we
can get
√
NA1(1) +
√
NA1(2) = 0. Since A1(2) =
A1(1) + ∆A1(1), we have
A1(1) = −1
2
∆A1(1)
and
A1(2) =
1
2
∆A1(1)
.
Let k1(0) = k1(1) = k1(3) = k1 −
√
N∆A1(1)/4 and
k1(2) = k1+
√
N∆A1(1)/4, where k1 is the average value
of k1(t). By Eq. (A7),
〈∆A1(1)〉 = 1
8
[
erf
∆A1(1) + 4(k1 + k0)/
√
N√
8ρ
+erf
∆A1(1)− 4(k1 + k0)/
√
N√
8ρ
+ 2erf
∆A1(1) + 4k1/
√
N√
8ρ
+2erf
∆A1(1)− 4k1/
√
N√
8ρ
+ erf
∆A1(1) + 4(k1 − k0)/
√
N√
8ρ
+erf
∆A1(1)− 4(k1 − k0)/
√
N√
8ρ
]
. (A10)
In general, the dynamics converges with k1, k0 ∼ N0,
yielding the self-consistent equation for ∆A1 in Eq. (8)
(we have made the dependence on t = 1 implicit).
To find the variance, we use Eq. (5). Knowing
〈Aµ∗(t)〉 = [A0(0) + A1(1) + A1(2) + A0(3)]/4 = 0, the
variance is calculated as:
σ2
N
=
N
16
[(−1
2
∆A1(1))2 + (
1
2
∆A1(1))2],
resulting in the expression for σ2/N in Eq. (8).
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APPENDIX B: THE STABILITY OF THE STEP
SIZE IN THE SECONDARY DIRECTION
We consider the stability of the step size in the sec-
ondary direction. Following the notation in Appendix A,
we assume (∆A1(1) ∼ N0) and µ = 0 at t = 0, and the
second direction is A0.
Suppose there is a small perturbation δA0(0) at t = 0,
then
k0(1) = k0(0)−
√
NδA0(0) = −
√
NδA0(0).
k1(1) = k1(0) = k1 −
√
N
4
∆A1(1) ≈ −
√
N
4
∆A1(1).
We obtain
∆A0(0) =
1
8
[−erf 2δA
0(0) + 12∆A
1(1)√
2ρ
−2erf 2δA
0(0)√
2ρ
− erf 2δA
0(0)− 12∆A1(1)√
2ρ
]. (B1)
Using Taylor expansion to the first order,
∆A0(0) =
− 1√
2piρ
(1 + e−
(∆A1(1))2
8ρ )δA0(0) ≡ δA0(1).
∆A1(0) = 0. (B2)
Similarly, for t = 1,
k0(2) = −
√
NδA0(0), k1(2) =
√
N
4
∆A1(1)
∆A1(1) = erf(
∆A1(1)√
8ρ
), ∆A0(1) = 0. (B3)
for t = 2,
k0(3) = −
√
NδA0(0), k1(3) = −
√
N
4
∆A1(1)
∆A1(2) = −erf(∆A
1(1)√
8ρ
), ∆A0(2) = 0. (B4)
for t = 3,
k0(4) = −2
√
NδA0(0)−
√
NδA0(1)
k1(4) = −
√
N
4
∆A1(1)
∆A0(3) = − 1√
2piρ
(1 + e−
(∆A1(1))2
8ρ )(δA0(0) + δA0(1))
∆A1(3) = 0. (B5)
δA0(4) is the accumulated perturbation from the previ-
ous time steps. That is,
∆A0(4) = δA0(0) + δA0(1)
− 1√
2piρ
(1 + e−
(∆A1(1))2
8ρ )(δA0(0) + δA0(1)). (B6)
leading to Eq. (9).
APPENDIX C: THE EQUATIONS OF MOTION
IN MG WITH BIMODAL PREFERENCE
DISTRIBUTION
For bimodal distribution of preferences of strategies,
the calculation is similar to that of Appendix A, except
changing Pωia from e
−ω2/2R/
√
2piR to δ(ωia−
√
ρN)/2+
δ(ωia +
√
ρN)/2.
For m = 1, the theoretical result is as follows: De-
noting the step functions by Θ1 = Θ(x +
√
ρN), Θ2 =
Θ(x−√ρN), we have
Aµ = Θ1(2kµ(t) + 2kµ(t)) + Θ2(2kµ(t) + 2kµ(t))
−Θ1(−(2kµ(t) + 2kµ(t)))−Θ2(−(2kµ(t) + 2kµ(t))),
Bµ = Θ1(2kµ(t)) + Θ2(2kµ(t))
−Θ1(−2kµ(t))−Θ2(−2kµ(t)),
Cµ = Θ1(2kµ(t)− 2kµ(t)) + Θ2(2kµ(t)− 2kµ(t))
−Θ1(−(2kµ(t)− 2kµ(t)))−Θ2(−(2kµ(t)− 2kµ(t)))
(C1)
For online update
kµ(t+ 1) = kµ(t)−
√
NAµ(t),
kµ(t+ 1) = kµ(t),
(C2)
then
∆Aµ(t) =
1
16
[Aµ(t+ 1) + 2Bµ(t+ 1) + Cµ(t+ 1)
−(Aµ(t) + 2Bµ(t) + Cµ(t))]. (C3)
∆Aµ(t) =
1
16
[Aµ(t+ 1)− Cµ(t+ 1)
−(Aµ(t)− Cµ(t))]. (C4)
Likewise, for batch update, with the notation µ = 1−µ,
Aµ = Θ1(2kµ(t) + 2kµ(t)) + Θ2(2kµ(t) + 2kµ(t))
−Θ1(−(2kµ(t) + 2kµ(t)))−Θ2(−(2kµ(t) + 2kµ(t))),
Bµ = Θ1(2kµ(t)) + Θ2(2kµ(t))
−Θ1(−2kµ(t))−Θ2(−2kµ(t)),
Cµ = Θ1(2kµ(t)− 2kµ(t)) + Θ2(2kµ(t)− 2kµ(t))
−Θ1(−(2kµ(t)− 2kµ(t)))−Θ2(−(2kµ(t)− 2kµ(t)))
(C5)
Since
kµ(t+ 1) = kµ(t)−
√
NAµ(t),
(C6)
16
we obtain
∆Aµ(t) =
1
16
[Aµ(t+ 1) + 2Bµ(t+ 1) + Cµ(t+ 1)
−(Aµ(t) + 2Bµ(t) + Cµ(t))]. (C7)
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